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Lalitha Nursilmula was a cheerful sixteen-year-old girl, who could 
often be found singing along to popular Bollywood tunes on her way 
to class.1 She was also bright and determined, focusing on studying 
commerce and economics at a local college in Godhumagudu.2 One 
day, while she was home alone, an employee of a microfinance 
company came to her village and asked her to travel to the community 
office where he could ask her a few questions.3 Once they arrived, the 
agent, the village head, and four members of the family’s “joint 
liability group” (villagers that had assumed collective responsibility 
for the debt) cornered Lalitha and demanded payment on an 
outstanding loan of 66,000 rupees that her family had borrowed to 
pay for the wedding of their elder daughter.4 The group threatened 
that they would humiliate her and her entire family if she didn’t bring 
the money by the end of the day.5 “Sell your body if you have to,” the 
agent reportedly said.6 
Lalitha ran home, crying the whole way.7 She called her mother 
and tried to explain what happened, but her mother could barely make 
out the words in the midst of Lalitha’s sobbing.8 Lalitha then 
 
1 Under Water, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2010, at 56; see also Andrew Buncombe, Suicides 
and Pressure Tactics Tarnish Image of Micro-Finance Lending, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Nov. 22, 2010, at 26. 
2 Buncombe, supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 Under Water, supra note 1. 
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swallowed a lethal dose of pesticide,9 and although her relatives 
scrambled home to save her, they were too late.10 Before taking her 
own life, Lalitha left a note imploring her parents to not take out any 
more loans, except to invest in the education of their younger son.11 
Lalitha’s suicide was one of many tragedies that swept over rural 
villages in Southern India this past year. At least seventy-five people 
facing pressure to repay loans to microfinance firms, have committed 
suicide in the fall of 2010 in the state of Andhra Pradesh.12 These 
suicides are generally linked to the deep shame that Indians feel 
towards failing to repay debt.13 
Many Indians have found themselves in desperate straits, taking 
out new loans to repay old ones, and creating a spiral of crushing 
debt.14 Widely reported stories of Lalitha’s fate, and many other tragic 
suicides, have stirred anger against unscrupulous microfinance 
lenders.15 In the winter of 2011, the microfinance industry faced a 
near collapse as nearly all borrowers in Andhra Pradesh, one of the 
 
9 Under Water, supra note 1. 
10 Buncombe, supra note 1. 
11 Under Water, supra note 1. 
12 Buncombe, supra note 1. 
13 See, e.g., H.S. Saksena, Debt Bondage: An Anthropological View, 31 E. ANTHRO. 
291 (1978); Mrinal K. Mitra & S.K. Mishra, Forward and Backward Linkages of Rural 
Indebtedness: A Study of Four Tribal Villages, 16 MAN AND LIFE [Calcutta], 37 (1990); 
Pradip K. Bhowmick & P. Sahoo, Tribal Indebtedness: A Socio-Economic Analysis, 23 
MAN AND LIFE [Midnapur], 91 (1997); N.K. Behura & N. Panigrahi, Tribal Indebtedness 
and the Functioning of Money Lenders Regulations in the Scheduled Areas of Orissa: An 
Empirical Study, 53 J. ANTHRO. SURV. INDIA 1 (2004); Gustav Peebles, The Anthropology 
of Credit and Debt, 39 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 225 (2010); see also, Lydia Polgreen & Vikas 
Bajaj, India Microcredit Faces Collapse From Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A5 
(quoting Vijay Mahajan, the chairman of a non-profit organization as saying that the 
aggressive approach of some microfinance firms “led to more indebtedness, and in some 
cases it led to suicides”); Uzma Qureshi & David Roodman, Microfinance as Business 15 
(Ctr. for Global Dev. Working Paper No. 101, 2006), available at http://www.cgdev.org 
/files/10742_file_Microfinance_as_Business.pdf (noting that public humiliation of women 
in Indian culture “gives males in the household and in the lineage a bad reputation”). For a 
tentative exploration into the relationship between the growth of microfinance on suicides, 
see Arvind Ashta, et al, Does Microfinance Cause or Reduce Suicides? Policy 
Recommendations for Reducing Borrower Stress 9, 23 (Working Paper, 2011), available 
at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.49964/Does%20Microfinance 
%20Cause.pdf (finding stable suicide rates overall, but noting that “women suicides in 
Andhra Pradesh by microfinance borrowers are higher than the average female suicide 
rates”). 
14 See Buncombe, supra note 1. 
15 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13 (tracing the building crisis over alleged coercive 
practices of some microlenders). 
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largest states in India, stopped repaying their loans.16 These 
revelations have pushed the microfinance industry to the brink of 
collapse.17 Moreover, it appears that the perception of microlending 
has shifted among elites, marking a dramatic change of fortune for the 
microfinance industry.18 
A second line of assault has come from the politicians. Legislators 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh have responded to abusive practices in 
the microfinance industry by passing strict new laws regulating how 
the microfinance industry can make loans and collect payments.19 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. (“Indian banks, which put up about 80 percent of the money that the companies 
lent to poor consumers, are increasingly worried that . . . they could now face serious 
losses.”). Moreover, at least one Indian state has enacted laws that would harm the 
profitability of microfinance firms. See All Things Considered, India's Poor Reel under 
Microfinance Debt Burden (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 31, 2010) [hereinafter India’s Poor 
Reel] available at http://www.npr.org/2010/12/31/132497267/indias-poor-reel-under-
microfinance-debt-burden (“[This] legislation . . . will, in effect, put the microlenders out 
of business.”). 
18 Microfinance Focus conducted an opinion poll of 165 delegates to the Microfinance 
India Summit 2009, including key stakeholders in the microfinance world. Notably, when 
asked whether the government should impose a cap on interest rates charged by 
microfinance institutions, 51% said “no.” Opinion Poll Brings Forth Key Trends in Indian 
Microfinance, MICROFIN. FOCUS, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.microfinancefocus.com /news 
/2009/11/02/opinion-poll-brings-forth-key-trends-of-indian-microfinance/. This polling 
data, though from an unfamiliar source, gives some evidence that, before the microfinance 
scandals erupted, the elites had opposed capping interest rates, a proposal that has 
subsequently gained support in some Indian states. See, e.g., Andhra Law To Curb 
Microfinance Firms Comes into Force, BUS. STANDARD, Jan. 2, 2011, 2011 WLNR 
38569; AP Law To Curb Microfinance Firms Implemented, DAILY PAK BANKER 
(Pakistan), Jan. 2, 2011, 2011 WLNR 60086 [hereinafter DAILY PAK BANKER, AP Law]. 
Hostile newspaper articles directed at microfinance also provide some evidence of a shift 
of opinion among the elites, as do articles from pro-business sources defending 
microfinance against aggressive reforms and offering incremental solutions. See, e.g., 
Abhijit Banerjee et al., Help Microfinance, Don't Kill It, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, Nov. 26, 
2010, 2010 WLNR 23517175 (“But politicians also need to be wary - in taking aim at the 
occasional overstep, they may find themselves inadvertently destroying the whole 
business, at great cost both to the poor, and the financial institutions that have stepped in to 
work with them.”); R. Jagannathan, Why Microfinance is Not Half the Villain it Seems To 
Be, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Dec. 9, 2010, 2010 WLNR 24363054 (“The Andhra ban 
on coercive collections is a palliative, but the real solution lies in regulating the sector 
better . . . .”); Leave Well Alone: Capping Microfinance Interest Rates Will Hurt the Poor. 
There Are Better Ways to Regulate the Industry, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2010, at 16 
[hereinafter Leave Well Alone] http://www.economist.com/node/17522606?story_id 
=17522606. Finally, a periodical search did not reveal any polling regarding how the 
Indian public views microfinance, or whether these views have shifted. 
19 See Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 
2011, available at http://indiamicrofinance.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Andhra-MFI 
-Ordinance.pdf (imposing registration requirements, conferring authority to an agency to 
cancel such registration upon complaints from the public and after a hearing, prohibiting 
individuals from joining more than one self-help group (e.g., a joint liability group),  
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Proponents of this crackdown point to growing reports of suicides 
among poor people unable to pay their debts, and argue that an 
unregulated microfinance industry has led to the proliferation of 
abusive practices.20 Proponents also argue that as the microfinance 
industry has shifted from a focus on charity to a focus on profits, the 
banks have extended loans without making sure these loans were 
applied to start-up businesses.21 Indeed, it seems that many poor 
Indian borrowers, like Lalitha’s family, have started using 
microfinance loans to pay for education, increase their quality of life, 
and boost their consumer activity in addition to promoting business 
production. 
Opponents of the crackdown argue that many of these proposals 
are misguided and would constrict lending to poor villagers.22 They 
contend that the microfinance industry, though imperfect, is too 
important to abandon as India’s poor citizens start to gain power 
through their increased activity as consumers and producers within 
the capitalist system.23 Clearly, however, some reforms must be 
implemented to respond to the legitimate grievances of the public. 
What has been overlooked in this debate is the role of legal debt relief 
in addressing these grievances and stabilizing lending in rural India. 
Although India has a consumer bankruptcy law on its books, the 
law has not been significantly updated for one hundred years.24 Nor 
does it appear that Indians tend to take advantage of its protections.25 
 
imposing interest rate caps, prohibiting generally the issuance of multiple loans, banning 
any coercive measures, etc.); see also Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13 (making note of 
this law); DAILY PAK BANKER, AP Law, supra note 18 (noting that the governor signed it 
into law on January 1, 2011). 
20 See, e.g., Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13; Jason Burke, Small Loans, Big Problem: 
How a Good Idea to Lift Indians Out of Poverty Became a Bad Dream: Unregulated, 
Unscrupulous Microfinance Firms Blamed for Hardship and Suicides, GUARDIAN (U.K.), 
Feb. 1, 2011 at Int’l 28; Jaideep Hardikar, Micro Menace Micro Finance Institutions 
(MFIs), Which Began Life as a Poverty-Alleviation Tool that Delivered Much-Needed 
Credit to Rural Areas, Have Today Turned Commercial, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Jan. 
1, 2011, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_microfinance-institutions     
-are-a-menace_1489045. 
21 See India PM Panel: Microfinance Institutions' Business Model is Full of Fault, 
DAILY PAK BANKER (Pakistan), Jan. 6, 2011, 2011 WLNR 371051 [hereinafter DAILY 
PAK BANKER, India PM Panel] (“[Microfinance institutions] have been indulging in 
multiple lending and large parts of the loans are given for consumption purposes.”). 
22 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18. 
23 Id. 
24 See Adam Feibelman, Consumer Finance and Insolvency Law in India, A Case 
Study, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 106 (2010) [hereinafter Feibelman, India]. 
25 Id. at 114. 
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The failure of Indians to utilize existing bankruptcy protections raises 
some interesting questions. Does the statutory text of India’s 
consumer bankruptcy law contain provisions that severely restrict 
who can file for bankruptcy? Do cultural reasons explain why Indians 
do not take advantage of bankruptcy relief? Is the deep shame 
associated with failing to pay debts in Indian culture similar to the 
shame associated with becoming bankrupt? If a rural Indian farmer, 
overburdened with debt, feels that his situation is hopeless and that 
there is no way out, could bankruptcy relief provide a way out? 
The microfinance crisis provides an opportunity to consider these 
questions and examine the role of consumer bankruptcy in facilitating 
economic development. Much ink has been spilled in legal circles 
writing about microfinance, with many articles addressing the 
problems and potential of consumer finance as a development tool.26 
However, consumer finance is only one piece of the puzzle when it 
comes to sustainable and inclusive development. Another big piece, 
consumer debt relief, has received scant attention.27 
This article advocates for the role of consumer bankruptcy in 
facilitating development in India, and argues that strengthening the 
consumer bankruptcy system would address the root of the grievances 
raised by the rebellion against microfinance by correcting the 
imbalance of power that exists between lenders and borrowers.28 
Increasing the role of consumer bankruptcy may reduce the political 
 
26 See, e.g., Jay Lee, Equity and Innovation: Using Traditional Islamic Banking Models 
to Reinvigorate Microlending and Innovation in Urban America, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 523 (2006); Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to the Microfinance 
Promise: A Proposal for a Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 1383 (2010); R.H. Tipton III, Microenterprise Through Microfinance and 
Microlending: The Missing Piece in the Overall Tribal Economic Development Puzzle, 29 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 173 (2004). 
27 But see Claire Moore Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and 
Formal Law: A Functional Understanding of Business Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 197 
(2011) [hereinafter Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneur] (“Historically, little 
practical attention has been paid to bankruptcy and insolvency laws in Sub-Saharan Africa 
. . . . This is unfortunate since these laws can be an effective means of putting 
unproductive assets back to productive use . . . . OHADA does provide an interesting and 
flexible three-level approach, allowing a business in sudden crisis to request the court's 
protection, and then also permitting reorganization, unless liquidation is the only realistic 
option.”); Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy, 39 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 63 (2009) [hereinafter Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy] (advocating for 
consumer bankruptcy as development policy); Feibelman, India, supra note 24. 
28 See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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pressure to adopt misguided proposals restricting microfinance, which 
would hurt the very people that such laws are meant to protect.29 
Part I provides a brief history and overview of microfinance. Part II 
recounts the recent rebellion against microfinance in India. Part III 
explores some of the populist legislation aimed at curbing 
microfinance industry excesses. Finally, Part IV argues that 
strengthening the consumer bankruptcy laws in India may help 
stabilize consumer finance while addressing the legitimate grievances 
that the people have against the microfinance industry. 
I 
MICROFINANCE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
This Part will briefly summarize the history of international 
microfinance and explain how it works. In contrast to the shiny public 
perception of microfinance, it has evolved into a much darker reality. 
The Grameen Bank is credited with starting the microfinance 
revolution in the 1970s.30 Microfinance institutions were originally 
intended to extend small loans to poor borrowers, who used this 
capital to fund small businesses.31 Microloans are often short-term 
 
29 The preamble to the Andhra Pradesh law restricting microfinance states: “Whereas 
these [self-help groups] are being exploited by private Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) 
through usurious interest rates and coercive means of recovery resulting in their 
impoverishment & in some cases leading to suicides, it is expedient to make provisions for 
protecting the interests of the [self-help groups], by regulating the money leading 
transactions by the money lending MFIs . . . .” Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions 
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011, http://indiamicrofinance.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2010/10/Andhra-MFI Ordinance.pdf. Despite the stated purpose of this populist 
legislation, the legislators in Andhra Pradesh may have a variety of motives beyond 
protecting poor debtors. 
30 See Molly Richardson, Increasing Microlending Potential in the United States 
Through a Strategic Approach to Regulatory Reform, 34 J. CORP. L. 923, 925 (2009); 
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West has Misperceived the 
Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 219 (2005) (“Formed in 
1976, the Grameen Bank's mission is to lend to those whose needs are not met by 
commercial lenders . . . .”). A few economists, working for the major neo-liberal funding 
organizations, helped to lay the intellectual framework for microfinance by championing 
the development potential of the informal sector. See Dickerson, Informal-Sector 
Entrepreneur, supra note 27, at 200. For example, the Peruvian economist Hernando de 
Soto was highly influential in advocating that property rights in the informal sector should 
be formalized. Id. at 200–01. 
31 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 925. 
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loans, having a duration of less than two years, and typically range 
from $10 to $1,000.32 
At their best, microfinance institutions offer economic 
opportunities to poor people, who are otherwise shut out of the formal 
lending sector. Traditional financial institutions do not typically make 
loans to small businesses33 because such loans carry a high risk of 
default and have high transaction costs.34 Even now, with 
microfinance loans widely accessible, many members of the farming 
classes rely instead on village loan sharks, notorious for high interest 
rates and abusive collection methods, to provide the bulk of rural 
credit in poor countries.35  
Microfinance has been credited with lifting many people out of 
poverty by increasing borrowers’ income and quality of life.36 Indeed, 
some scholars say that the rapid growth of global microfinance 
provides some evidence that “expanding access to consumer finance 
can promote development.”37 Microlenders often require these loans 
to be used for productive purposes associated with expanding a 
business, as opposed to personal consumption.38 Such productive uses 
 
32 Id. at 925–26. These loan amounts are typically at the lower end of this range. See 
Hardikar, supra note 20 (reporting that among the loan portfolios of the 146 self-reporting 
microfinance institutions in 2009, there was an average per borrower loan of $144.50). 
33 For present purposes, the term small business refers to businesses with fewer than 
five employees. 
34 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 925–26. However, there is reason to believe that 
the risk of default for microloans was often low because, until the recent crisis erupted, the 
banks enjoyed repayment rates of approximately 97%. See Buncombe, supra note 1. 
Nevertheless, it is true that microlending is time and labor intensive. See India’s Poor 
Reel, supra note 17 (“Microfinance lenders do their business on the client's doorstep, 
meaning that representatives have to travel to slums or rural villages to make the loans and 
then come back weekly to collect the payments.”). 
35 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18 (noting 82% of households in Andhra Pradesh 
hold informal loans). 
36 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 925–26; Hardikar, supra note 20. However, there 
is considerable dissent from this view. See Vikas Bajaj, Microlenders, Honored With 
Nobel, Are Struggling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at B3 (“Most borrowers do not appear to 
be climbing out of poverty, and a sizable minority is getting trapped in a spiral of debt, 
according to studies and analysts.”), ([quoting David Roodman, a senior fellow at the 
Center for Global Development] “‘Credit is both the source of possibilities and it’s a bond 
. . . [and it] is often operating at this knife’s edge, and that gets forgotten,’”). The 
Economist takes guardedly optimistic position on microfinance, stating “research suggests 
that it does work—for some people some of the time, as you would expect. It is not a 
magic bullet, but nor is it intrinsically harmful.” See Under Water, supra note 1. 
37 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 77. 
38 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 926. 
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may include purchasing raw materials or supplies, such as food 
ingredients or even cell phones.39 
Unlike traditional financial institutions, which often require the 
borrower to pass a credit check and put up collateral in exchange for a 
loan, microfinance institutions employ innovative methods to reduce 
the risks associated with lending to poor borrowers.40 In other words, 
microfinance institutions rely on informal constraints on behavior to 
encourage borrowers to repay their loans.41 The Grameen Bank, for 
example, employs peer lending circles, usually consisting of women, 
which rely on social pressure to assure loan repayment.42 The group 
may have joint responsibility for repaying the loan, or the entire group 
may be cut off from future loans if one member of the group fails to 
repay her loan.43 
The microfinance industry has been widely applauded for 
extending loans to millions of poor people in over 100 developing 
countries around the world, including countries in Asia, Africa, and 
the Americas.44 One leading microfinance institution, ACCION 
International, has lent $12.3 billion to nearly five million people 
between 1997 and 2006, all while achieving a repayment rate of 
97%.45 Many NGOs and philanthropic groups joined the microfinance 
bandwagon in the 1970s and started offering microloans in 
developing countries.46 The goal was to alleviate poverty in 
developing countries by vastly increasing accessibility to credit, 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. However, there is reason to believe that variations of these “innovative” methods 
have existed for quite a long time at the local level. 
41 Id.; Hardikar, supra note 20 (“[T]he Grameen methodology [includes] identify the 
poor, organise [sic] them (so there’s homogeneity and moral liability of repayment in the 
absence of any collateral), and standardise [sic] products and systems, enforce discipline, 
and ensure that any breach is dealt with severely and sternly.”). Such group lender works 
“in part by substituting reputation for conventional collateral—in other words, 
collateralizing reputation.” See Qureshi & Roodman, supra note 13, at 4. 
42 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 926. 
43 Id. (“Other methods include information gathering about a potential borrower, joint 
liability contracts, short term contracts, or ‘loan ladders,’ which increase subsequent loan 
amounts after each repayment.”). 
44 Id. A number of articles have explored the potential for importing the microfinance 
model to developed countries, including the Unites States. See sources cited, supra note 
26. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 927. 
326 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 317 
aiming to reach many of the three-quarters of Indians who survive on 
less than $2 a day.47 
As microfinance has come to be viewed as a high-growth industry, 
the number of commercial microcredit lenders increased 
dramatically.48 The microfinance industry gradually shifted from a 
non-profit model reliant on donors, to a for-profit model driven by 
shareholders.49 Amidst this shift, some microfinance institutions have 
grown at a rapid clip, achieving growth rates as high as 100% a 
year.50 The markets came to view the growth prospects of 
microfinance so bullishly that SKS Microfinance raised $357 million 
in its [2008] IPO on the Mumbai stock exchange.51 
This shift toward profit-based microlending raises some interesting 
questions. Did microlending start out with a charitable heart but came 
to be exploited by big banking interests? Does the microfinance 
system’s transformation from a non-profit philanthropy to a for-profit 
industry represent good policy? In the midst of this shift, has the 
balance of power shifted between lender and borrower in a way that is 
disadvantageous or crippling to borrowers? 
II 
MICROFINANCE ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE IN INDIA 
The world of profit-based microfinance in India has been badly 
shaken by recent scandals, pushing the entire microfinance industry to 
the brink of collapse.52 Microlending is failing in India for several 
reasons. First, there has been a cultural backlash generated by widely 
publicized stories of farmer suicides, abusive lender practices in a 
changing industry, and the political targeting of microfinance. 
Second, there have been economic setbacks associated with the fast 
growth of microfinance in India followed by a wave of defaults. 
Interestingly, exploiting the shame of default, coupled with intense 
peer pressure from the joint liability group,53 is exactly what has made 
microfinance so successful. In countries where the shame/peer 
 
47 See Under Water, supra note 1. 
48 See Richardson, supra note 30, at 927. 
49 See Hardikar, supra note 20. 
50 See Bajaj, supra note 36. However, the profitability of these lenders has decreased 
dramatically in light of recent events. In addition, some argue that these high profit 
margins have made the loans less effective. See infra note 74 and related text. 
51 See India’s Poor Reel, supra note 17. 
52 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
53 This refers to practices such as requiring collective responsibility for loan repayment. 
See supra note 41 and related text. 
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pressure combination is effective, microfinance institutions have 
enjoyed extremely high national payback rates.54 However, the 
exploitation of the deep shame rural Indians associate with debt has 
led to the proliferation of farmer suicides.55 This shame has been 
compounded by abusive practices of microfinance companies that 
detractors say have contributed to widespread tragic outcomes.56 
Critics of microfinance institutions argue that they place too much 
reliance on community pressure, instead of considering the individual 
borrower’s ability to repay.57 Second, they assert that microfinance 
institutions started using coercive methods to collect on debts, 
including intimidation.58 For example, bankers have hired underlings 
to coerce debtors into repaying by threatening to humiliate them 
before their community.59 Third, they argue that microfinance 
institutions, such as SKS Microfinance, have made huge profits on the 
backs of the poor, impoverishing rural Indians by cajoling them into 
accepting loans at exorbitant interest rates.60 To many local 
 
54 Although this topic is beyond the scope of this article, it would be interesting to 
explore how microfinance institutions rely on exploiting informal constraints on behavior 
to achieve high repayment rates. One could contrast the act of taking out a loan in the 
Unites States, which (at least in urban areas) is typically a very individual experience 
(rather than a communal one). Is the peer pressure model not applicable in the United 
States, which lacks the kind of communal pressures that make it successful in India? Do 
the recent debt rebellions suggest that relying on informal constraints is fatally flawed as a 
model, or can it survive with reforms? 
55 See supra note 13, and accompanying text (citing anthropological articles). 
56 See, e.g., Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13; Burke, supra note 20; Hardikar, supra 
note 20. For a discussion of how corporations have engaged in human rights abuses in 
India in different contexts, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias as Community 
Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility and the Failure of Transparency, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1048–51 (2003) [hereinafter Dickerson, Ozymandias] (detailing 
human rights abuses in India by Enron). 
57 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. In other words, the lenders were just in it for 
the money, rather than channeling money to activities that generate income for poor 
Indians. But see Bajaj, supra note 36 (“Many had used the money to pay for televisions or 
health care or to soften the blow of failed crops, rather than as seed money for 
businesses.”). On the other hand, Indians can benefit from the smoothing effect that 
receiving microloans may have on their income. 
58 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13; Under Water, supra note 1 (“Some ‘recovery’ 
methods have involved intimidation.”). 
59 See India’s Poor Reel, supra note 17, (in the account of one borrower, “[C]ollectors 
from the finance companies hounded her day and night, shaming her in front of her 
neighbors. They told her to get the money any way she could, by stealing if necessary, and 
they told her she'd be better off dead.”). 
60 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. These microfinance institutions typically 
charged interest rates of up to 36%. See DAILY PAK BANKER, India PM Panel, supra note 
21. However, it appears that some microfinance institutions admitted to charging 50 to  
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politicians, the microfinance industry has become just as bad as the 
widely hated village loan sharks that microfinance promised to 
replace.61 
Arguably, as the microfinance industry shifted from charity to 
profits, it lost sight of its traditional focus of helping the poor.62 One 
might ask whether making profits and helping the poor are ever 
compatible, or if this is just a pipe dream of “social entrepreneurs.”63 
 
60% interest. See BUS. STANDARD, Andhra Law, supra note 18. Presumably, the 
competition with nonprofit firms, as well as with loan sharks, would serve to keep interest 
rates down. Moreover, these interest rates might be more justified in light of the inflation 
picture. It seems, however, that part of the anger stems from the very idea of earning 
profits from making loans to poor people. See Hardikar, supra note 20. Muhammed 
Yunus, the Grameen Bank founder, reflected this mood by criticizing microfinance 
institutions that have gone public, stating “[w]hen you put an IPO, you are promising your 
investors that there is a lot of money to be made and this is a wrong message. Poor people 
should not be shown as an opportunity to make money out of.” Id. 
61 See Hardikar, supra note 20 (“‘We created microcredit to fight the loan sharks,’ 
reasoned Professor Muhammed Yunus . . . ‘We didn't create microcredit to encourage new 
loan sharks.’”); Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. Ironically, one senior official in Andhra 
Pradesh, Reddy Subrahmanyam, expressed nostalgia for the village loan sharks, stating 
‘”[t]he money lender lives in the community . . . At least you can burn down his house. 
With these companies, it is loot and scoot.’” See id. In other words, is it better to have the 
devil you know (and whose house you can set on fire) than the devil you don’t (who lives 
in a high-rise condo downtown)? However, it appears that the microfinance industry has 
received a disproportionate share of the blame for farmer suicides in India, for many of 
these borrowers owed even larger sums of money to the local loan shark. See, e.g., Under 
Water, supra note 1 (“Anthaiah took his own life as a payment loomed on a 15,000 rupee 
($333) [microfinance] loan. Heavy rain had waterlogged his cotton crop and left the family 
struggling to pay the interest rate of 36% a year. But the couple, who had borrowed to 
build this house, also owed 34,000 rupees to a local moneylender, who charged over 
50%.”). 
62 See Hardikar, supra note 20 (“But what was pitted as an innovating financial practice 
to address poverty, is now being viewed as the next big investment opportunity, a concept 
that critics say is antithetical to its charitable roots.”). In addition, it is not clear whether 
the interest rates charged by for-profit microfinance firms materially differed from non-
profit firms. Nonprofit firms, like for-profit firms, operate under pressure based on the 
bottom line. Perhaps, however, the managers of for-profit firms are under a more intense 
form of pressure. 
63 Generally speaking, “social entrepreneurs” are liberals that want to solve social 
problems with capitalist and/or market-based solutions. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The 
Role of Microfinance, N.Y. TIMES ON THE GROUND BLOG (Dec. 28, 2009, 2:28 PM), http: 
//kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/the-role-of-microfinance/(praising the “remarkable 
achievement” of microfinance); Nicholas Kristof, Op-Ed, Do-Gooders with Spreadsheets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A21 (quoting approvingly a description of social 
entrepreneurs as “the most important historical force at work today”); Nicholas Kristof, 
Op-Ed, You, Too, Can Be a Banker to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A19 (“For 
those readers who ask me what they can do to help fight poverty, one option is to sit down 
at your computer and become a microfinancier.”); Stephanie Strom, Thanksgiving 
Reading: Charity with a Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Nov. 23, 2006, 
10:37 AM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2006/11/23/thanksgiving-reading-charity-with-a- 
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This widespread hostility toward microfinance marks a dramatic 
reversal of fortune for the industry, which previously was touted as 
one of the best hopes for alleviating poverty in rural India.64 Not long 
ago, the microfinance industry was showered with praise (and cash) 
by politicians, philanthropists, and bankers.65 In 2000, world leaders 
enshrined microfinance as one of the pillars of the United Nations’ 
ambitious Millennium Development Goals for 2015, which sought to 
reduce the number of people living in extreme poverty by half. 66 This 
trickle-up form of capitalism was so appealing to leaders in the 
developed world that Muhammad Yunus, one of the founders of 
microfinance, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.67 
The public outcry stemming from these perceived abuses has been 
thunderous, directed largely at unscrupulous microfinance lenders.68 
In the winter of 2011, the microfinance system faced collapse as 
nearly all borrowers in Andhra Pradesh, one of the largest states in 
India, stopped repaying their loans.69 In fact, loan-recovery rates 
plummeted from higher than 95% to below 15%.70 Local politicians, 
seeing this crisis as an opportunity to burnish their populist 
 
bottom-line/ (“[This] year, as never before, the line between philanthropy and business is 
blurring. A new generation of philanthropists . . . believe that [capitalism] can be applied 
in the service of charity. They are ‘philanthropreneurs,’ driven to do good and have their 
profit, too.”); Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., ‘Patient’ Capital for an Africa That Can’t 
Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A23 (“Africa needs many things, but most of all it 
needs capitalists who can start and run legal companies . . . . People grow out of poverty 
when they create small businesses that employ their neighbors. Nothing else lasts.”). 
Perhaps the microfinance movement taps into a famous idiom, “you can give a man a fish, 
and he’ll eat for a day. But if you teach him how to fish, he’ll eat for a lifetime.” In this 
case, the microfinancier is not teaching how to fish, but is fronting some money to buy the 
bait. 
64 See supra note 63 and accompanying text; David Leonhardt, A Fresh Look at 
Fighting Global Poverty, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Apr. 26, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/a-fresh-look-at-fighting-global-poverty/ 
(quoting Yale economist Dean Karlan as stating that microcredit “has generated more 
enthusiasm and support than perhaps any other development tool in history.”). 
65 See Bajaj, supra note 36. “Philanthropists and investors poured billions of dollars 
into nonprofit and profit-making microlenders.” Id. The success of microfinance was also 
illustrated by SKS’s IPO. 
66 Id. 
67 See India’s Poor Reel, supra note 17. 
68 See Buncombe, supra note 1. 
69 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
70 See Buncombe, supra note 1; Under Water, supra note 1; Vikas Bajaj, Luster Dims 
For a Public Microlender, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at B1 [hereinafter Bajaj, Luster 
Dims] (noting that only ten percent of SKS’s borrower in Andhra Pradesh repaid their 
loans during the first three months of 2011). 
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credentials with the rural poor, encouraged borrowers to default en 
masse.71 Ironically, the microfinance industry’s success in India has 
sometimes made it a political target because so many voters owe them 
money.72 Championing the cause of poor microfinance borrowers, 
politicians have characterized microlenders as profiteering on the 
backs of the poor.73 
This crisis portends ill for the future of microfinance in India. For 
starters, the microfinance industry in India is highly concentrated in 
Andhra Pradesh, where half of all microcredit borrowers reside.74 
Therefore, if the microfinance crisis were contained in Andhra 
Pradesh, that would be damaging enough. However, the loan rebellion 
in Andhra Pradesh has rippled across the nation.75 Lending has 
slowed down considerably in other states due to growing fears of 
defaults.76 Until recently, the microfinance industry was growing at a 
rapid pace, but political backlash77 has halted its expansion.78 Worse, 
 
71 See Under Water, supra note 1. In the past, political parties have used their 
opponents’ ties to foreign banks as a political wedge issue. Id. (“The main opposition 
Telugu Desam Party lost power in 2004 partly because it was seen as in thrall to the IT 
industry and foreign investors.”). However, the extent to which this debt revolt was 
centrally organized by politicians and/or activists is not clear. In some cases, local activists 
overstepped the bounds of persuasion by “physically prevent[ing] loan collectors from 
entering . . . villages.” See Buncombe, supra note 1. Either way, the effect was to create a 
massive boycott against microfinance. 
72 See Under Water, supra note 1. 
73 Id. 
74 See Jagannathan, supra note 18 (“Andhra Pradesh is now second only to Bangladesh 
as the most microfinance saturated place on earth, with a full 17% of the population in 
possession of a microloan account.”); Under Water, supra note 1 (“[Andhra Pradesh] 
accounts for at least half India’s total, with more than 25m borrowers, up from 8m in 
2007.”); But cf. Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13 (one-third reside in Andhra Pradesh). As 
The Economist has put it, “Andhra Pradesh is not so much the jewel in its crown as the 
crown itself.” See Under Water, supra note 1. 
75 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
76 Id.; see Bajaj, supra note 36 (“Banks, the primary source of money for microlenders, 
have turned off the tap because they are worried about the industry’s future. As a result, 
microlenders have slowed or stopped lending nationwide.”); see also Paul Beckett, The 
Microfinance Crisis: Is There a Way Out?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE INDIA REAL TIME BLOG, 
(Aug. 1, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/08/01/the-microfinance 
-crisis-is-there -a-way-out/ (“Almost immediately, banks turned off the credit tap that 
allows microfinance lenders to operate . . . .”). 
77 There are at least two components to the political backlash against microfinance: 
first, the mass boycott in Andhra Pradesh; and second, the legislation promulgated to 
address abusive practices. For present purposes, they are conflated together into one large 
political backlash that threatens the future of the microfinance industry. 
78 The Indian credit rating firm Crisil Ltd. has downgraded the credit ratings of twelve 
microfinance institutions to “rating watch with negative implications.” See Aveek Datta, 
Crisil Puts 12 Microfinance Lenders on Ratings Watch, LIVEMINT.COM, Nov. 23, 2010,  
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if these trends continue, they could potentially destroy microfinance 
in Andhra Pradesh and possibly beyond.79 For example, SKS 
Microfinance reported a net loss for the second quarter, based on 
widespread borrower defaults.80 
The stringent anti-microfinance law in Andhra Pradesh, however, 
may soon be superseded by national legislation.81 In July of 2011, 
India’s Ministry of Finance released a draft microfinance bill that 
would put the central Reserve Bank of India in charge of regulating 
microfinance country-wide.82 Investors cheered the prospect of 
nationalizing the regulation of microfinance and overriding existing 
state laws.83 News of the proposal drove the stock price of SKS, the 
largest microfinance institution in India, up twenty percent on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange.84 This market reaction indicates that 
investors believe the proposed law will be good for the microfinance 
industry. However, the proposed law does impose tough regulations 
on the industry in its own right, including provisions that confer 
authority to the Reserve Bank of India to restrict profit margins, 
interest rates, and fees.85 
 
http://www.livemint.com/2010/11/22213206/Crisil-puts-12-microfinance-le.html?atype    
=tp. Moreover, the stock price of the leading commercial lender, SKS Microfinance, had 
dropped by 36.79% from Oct. 15, 2010 to Nov. 23, 2010. Id. 
79 See Under Water, supra note 1. This crisis has spread to microlenders in other 
developing countries. Id. (“In Pakistan’s Punjab province, for example, it became 
fashionable in 2008–09 for politicians to encourage borrowers to default on microloans.”); 
Leave Well Alone, supra note 18 (“In Bangladesh the government has capped the annual 
interest rate that microfinance institutions . . . can charge at 27%.”). 
80 See Becket, supra note 76. 
81 See, e.g., Nupur Acharya, India Releases Draft Bill on Microfinance Regulations, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023 
03365804576430911193252084.html; India Microfinance Law Would Make RBI 
Regulator; SKS Shares Rise, ECON. TIMES, July 7, 2011, http://economictimes.indiatimes 
.com/markets/regulation/india-microfinance-law-would-make-rbi-regulator-sks-shares-rise 
/articleshow/9134864.cms [hereinafter, SKS Shares Rise]; Microfinance Regulation Bill 
Boosts India’s SKS, THE DAILY STAR, July 8, 2011, http://www.thedailystar.net/new 
Design/news-details.php?nid=193401 [hereinafter, Bill Boosts India’s SKS]; Tripti Lahiri, 
Markets Cheer Microfinance Draft Law, WALL ST. J. ONLINE INDIA REAL TIME BLOG 
(July 7, 2011, 5:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/07/07/markets-cheer       
-microfinance-draft-law; Samit Ghosh, India Microfinance Bill—The Good and The Bad, 




84 See, e.g., Bill Boosts India's SKS, supra note 81. 
85 See SKS Shares Rise, supra note 80. 
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The current reaction to the scandals associated with microfinance 
could destroy the industry, an outcome with severe consequences for 
poor borrowers.86 First, because traditional banks are unwilling to 
extend loans in small amounts, or to risky borrowers, destroying 
microfinance would cut off an important source of capital to poor 
borrowers.87 Second, borrowers may be forced to rely on village loan 
sharks once again.88  
III 
POPULIST LEGISLATION AIMED AT PROTECTING THE POOR 
HARMS DEBTORS 
Responding to a series of scandals in the microfinance industry, 
Indian policymakers have recently undertaken to address the costs 
and negative externalities associated with expanding consumer 
finance, such as consumer financial distress and over-indebtedness.89 
In general, a variety of options are available to policymakers to 
address these problems, including “usury laws, disclosure 
requirements, financial education, laws prohibiting particular 
transactions or terms, limits on debt collection, and debt relief.”90 This 
Part will explain how some of these legislative proposals end up 
hurting poor borrowers by reducing consumer lending, and therefore 
illustrating the need to empower consumers in a different way, for 
example, by strengthening the consumer bankruptcy laws. 
A number of states in India have advanced policies aimed at 
stabilizing lending and addressing the costs associated with consumer 
indebtedness.91 Legislators in Andhra Pradesh passed a stringent new 
law regulating consumer finance.92 This law changes the business 
practices of microfinance institutions in a number of ways, such as 
 
86 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
87 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18. Some have portrayed this result, cutting off 
capital to poor borrowers, as “financial apartheid.” See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
However, this view ignores the important role that the informal lending sector has and 
continues to play in allocating capital in rural areas. Moreover, modest government 
lending programs exist that could help fill the void. 
88 Id. 
89 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 67. These costs have existed 
for some time, but it seems that the recent scandals have heightened the urgency to deal 
with them. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the costs of 
expanding consumer finance have been ignored in India). 
90 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 67. 
91 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
92 See id.; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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capping the interest rate an institution may legally charge.93 
Moreover, the federal government is coordinating with the reserve 
bank of India, the country’s central bank, on a new set of 
comprehensive federal regulations to govern the microfinance 
industry.94 
The policy of capping interest rates, despite its good intentions, is 
misguided for several reasons.95 Although microfinance institutions 
appear to charge high interest rates, they typically have thin profit 
margins due to the high administrative costs associated with making 
and collecting millions of small loans.96 Until recently, microfinance 
institutions were able to attract large amounts of private capital,97 and 
this success could be squandered if the government forces down 
interest rates, thus diminishing the growth prospects of for-profit 
microfinance firms.98 Moreover, slow growth would hinder the ability 
of microfinance institutions to “harness economies of scale in order to 
lower transaction costs and cut rates of their own accord.”99 Second, 
capping interest rates may decrease the incentive for new companies 
to enter the market, therefore reducing competition among lenders.100 
Should capping interest rates lead to lower loan availability, it is 
worth considering whether this could have unintended negative 
consequences. For example, insofar as capping interest rates 
decreases the amount of capital that microfinance firms are willing to 
lend, the poor could be forced to rely more on village loan sharks.101 
Notwithstanding that microfinance has made significant inroads into 
 
93 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
94 See Bajaj, supra note 36. (the Economist, while rejecting “wrongheaded” interest rate 
caps, has endorsed a host of “[s]ensible regulation[s],” including setting up a credit bureau 
and permitting microfinance institutions to take deposits); see Leave Well Alone, supra 
note 18. 
95 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18. 
96 Id. As discussed earlier, although the 97% repayment rate would suggest these 
investments are not very risky, the extension of microloans is labor and time intensive. See 
supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
97 See India’s Poor Reel, supra note 17 (discussing SKS Microfinance’s $357 million 
IPO). 
98 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 On the other hand, one could argue that lowering the interest rates for microfinance 
firms would widen the gap with the larger interest rates charged by village loan sharks, 
therefore reducing the latter’s attractiveness. However, this assumes that loan sharks have 
such high structural costs that they cannot lower their own interest rates in response to 
these competitive pressures. 
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rural areas of developing countries, village moneylenders still 
“provide the bulk of rural credit.”102 In fact, in the rural areas of 
Andhra Pradesh itself, only 11% of households held loans from 
microfinance institutions, but an astonishing 82% held informal 
loans.103 Is this the result that policymakers wish to achieve, the 
empowerment of loan sharks? 
In conclusion, policymakers should be cautious of hurting the very 
consumers they are ostensibly trying to protect, for many of these 
policies have ambiguous welfare benefits.104 For example, “most 
substantive regulations of consumer lending, such as usury laws or 
property exemptions, are likely to increase the cost and/or reduce the 
availability of credit.”105 Additionally, such regulations can slow the 
expansion of consumer finance, as illustrated by the Indian banks that 
have turned off the lending spigot due to fear of rising defaults.106 
Should the solution be to put loans out of reach of nano-
entrepreneurs? Is there another way to empower nano-entrepreneurs, 
while preserving the microfinance industry? 
IV 
SOLUTION: BOLSTER THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
As Indian policymakers consider how to address the costs and 
negative externalities associated with expanding consumer finance, 
particularly the plague of over-indebtedness, they would do well to 
consider strengthening their consumer bankruptcy regime.107 Doing so 
would likely provide more stable growth in consumer finance by 
increasing the predictability of debt collection. However, consumer 
bankruptcy reform has been largely absent from the debate on how to 
respond to the microfinance scandals. This absence suggests that 
Indian elites do not view such reforms as desirable policy. What 
factors may account for the absence of consumer bankruptcy reforms 
from the national discourse? Are there structural impediments to 
making the legal machinery of bankruptcy accessible to farmers and 
small businessmen? Is bankruptcy so absent from the cultural 
discourse in India that small farmers and businessmen would not take 
 
102 See Leave Well Alone, supra note 18. 
103 Id. 
104 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 67. “Such rules and 
regimes are thus desirable only if their beneficial welfare effects outweigh their costs.” Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 For present purposes, the term “consumer bankruptcy” refers to the insolvency 
system that is available to nano-entrepreneurs and ordinary consumers. 
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advantage of the system even if it were accessible? Would bankruptcy 
carry the same shameful stigma that caused many farmers to commit 
suicide? 
Part A.1. explores the current Indian consumer bankruptcy law, 
draws comparisons to U.S. consumer bankruptcy law, and considers 
what aspects of India’s consumer bankruptcy law hinder its 
accessibility. Part A.2. goes on to explore whether this regime works 
in practice, finding that there are a number of cultural, administrative, 
and economic obstacles to making consumer bankruptcy in India 
accessible on a larger scale. Parts B and C conclude by advocating for 
the strengthening of India’s consumer bankruptcy system to (1) 
address the dangers associated with expanding consumer finance in 
India, and (2) help save the microfinance industry by correcting the 
imbalance of power between debtors and creditors, which in turn, 
would remove the impetus for misguided populist laws aimed at 
protecting the poor. 
A.  How Effective Is India’s Current Consumer Bankruptcy 
System? 
This section starts by comparing the consumer bankruptcy law of 
the United States and India as it relates to property exemptions and 
discharge of debt, with a focus on a few provisions of India’s 
insolvency system that discourage consumers and small business 
owners from seeking bankruptcy protection. This section concludes 
with a discussion of other psychological and cultural barriers that may 
limit the Indian bankruptcy system’s effectiveness. Indian 
policymakers ought to remove these barriers where possible. 
1.  Current Bankruptcy Law 
India has a consumer bankruptcy regime that is approximately 100 
years old, dating back to British colonial rule,108 which has not been 
significantly altered since its adoption.109 The Presidency Towns 
Insolvency Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act, two separate 
 
108 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 106–07. Many developing countries do not 
have any provisions for consumer bankruptcy. See Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in 
Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 (2002) (discussing how many nations, 
including China, Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, and Venezuela, do not allow debt forgiveness for consumers). 
109 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 107. 
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statutes, provide the formal sources for India’s consumer insolvency 
regime.110 
a.  Property Exemptions 
Under the Indian insolvency acts, some property is exempt from 
recovery by creditors.111 These exemptions generally incorporate 
those available under the Code of Civil Procedure.112 Specifically, 
Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the following 
property is liable to attachment and sale under execution of decree: 
lands, houses or other buildings.113 However, Section 60 goes on to 
list the property exemptions, providing that the following particulars 
shall not be liable to such attachment or sale: 
(a) the necessary wearing-apparel, cooking vessels, beds and 
bedding of the judgment-debtor, his wife and children, and such 
personal ornaments as, in accordance with religious usage, cannot 
be parted with by any woman; 
(b) tools of artisans, and, where the judgment-debtor is an 
agriculturist, his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed-
grain as may, in the opinion of the court, be necessary to enable him 
to earn his livelihood as such, and such portion of agricultural 
produce or of any class of agricultural produce as may have been 
declared to be free from liability under the provisions of the next 
following section; 
(c) houses and other buildings (with the materials and the sites 
thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary 
for their enjoyment) belonging to [an agriculturist or a labourer or a 
domestic servant] and occupied by him;114 
As a general matter, under the U.S. bankruptcy code, property 
exempted by the debtor is protected from creditors against any debt 
deemed to have arisen before the bankruptcy case began.115 There are 
two main policy considerations for protecting a portion of bankrupt 
debtors’ property.116 First, considering basic notions of fairness, 
 
110 Id. (noting that these two Acts are largely equivalent in substance). 
111 Id. at 109. 
112 See CODE CIV. PROC., No. 5 of 1908 (India). 
113 Id. at ¶ 60. 
114 Id. 
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2010). 
116 Of course, scholars have debated a host of alternative theories for consumer 
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A 
Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (2003); Sean C. 
Currie, The Multiple Purposes of Bankruptcy: Restoring Bankruptcy’s Social Insurance 
Function after BAPCPA, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 241 (2009); Adam Feibelman, 
Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.  
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society should not deprive debtors of certain essentials that everyone 
needs to live day-to-day.117 Second, there is a third-party interest and 
a public interest in letting debtors obtain a fresh start, so as to not 
become completely destitute.118 
The U.S. bankruptcy code mirrors the Indian insolvency act in 
certain respects. Specifically, it provides that the following property 
of the debtor is exempt from recovery: (1) a homestead used as a 
residence; (2) one motor vehicle; (3) household goods, crops, 
animals; (4) jewelry; (5) tools of the trade; etc.119 Notably, there is 
often a dollar limitation attached to these exemptions.120 For example, 
in the United States, the federal homestead exemption covers the 
debtor’s aggregate interest in the homestead of up to approximately 
$21,625.121 However, it is important to note that federal bankruptcy 
law permits states to opt-out of the federal exemptions and provide 
their own.122 At least thirty-five states have done so, and many of 
these states provide much more generous homestead exemptions.123 
Why do individual Americans tend to file for bankruptcy? 
Available data suggests that most consumers in America are likely to 
become insolvent or experience financial distress due to unexpected 
exogenous shocks, such as involuntary unemployment or sickness.124 
Moreover, the data indicates that many middle-class debtors are 
homeowners that use bankruptcy to attempt to hang on to their 
 
REV. 129, 129 (2005) (stating that consumer bankruptcy functions, at least in part, as a 
form of social insurance). 
117 See Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 471, 477 (1998) (emphasizing humanitarian considerations). 
118 See Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 
141, 141 (1998) (“The fresh start principle generally takes the form of forgiving the debtor 
part or all of the debts she incurred prior to her bankruptcy filing.”); Katherine Porter & 
Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 
(2006). The fresh start principle has deep roots in American jurisprudence. In 1934, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that bankruptcy “gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor 
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 




123 See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 129 
(“Twenty-two states have exemptions that would allow them to exempt at least [fifty 
thousand dollars].”). 
124 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 79. 
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homes.125 This suggests that in America the homestead property 
exemption is a major incentive to file for bankruptcy. Indeed, a more 
generous property exemption may even encourage entrepreneurial 
activity.126 
The Indian homestead exemption, on the other hand, does not 
provide the same incentive to file for bankruptcy that the American 
homestead exemption provides. The Indian insolvency scheme also 
provides a kind of homestead exemption, as it exempts the houses and 
related land of agriculturists, laborers, and domestic servants. 
However, because a large proportion of Indian debtors are not 
homeowners, this homestead exemption does not incentivize filing for 
bankruptcy to protect their home. Perhaps this insight helps to explain 
why Indians do not take advantage of their bankruptcy system. 
b.  Discharge of Debts 
India’s consumer bankruptcy law provides for the discharge of 
debts in some circumstances.127 However, in a variety of 
circumstances discharge is not available.128 Although some of these 
conditions for discharge are relatively objective, others are more 
subjective.129 The latter permits a judge to exercise considerable 
discretion, and courts have the power to grant a conditional 
discharge.130 Moreover, a number of debts are non-dischargeable, 
including debts to the government and debts involving fraud.131 
Under the U.S. bankruptcy code, creditors may make two types of 
challenges to discharge. First, they may object to discharge of 
particular debts under Section 523 based on the nature of the debt.132 
Such debts include taxes, debts obtained by fraud, family support, 
 
125 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 114 (6th ed. 2009). 
126 See Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of 
Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543, 543–44 (2003) (arguing that higher levels 
of homestead exemption encourages entrepreneurial activity by providing “wealth 
insurance” that reduces risk for small business owners). 
127 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 110 (“Where the debtor’s assets cannot 
satisfy his or her obligations, the debtor can apply for a discharge of the remaining 
obligations.”). 
128 Id. at 110–11. 
129 Id. (“For example, a debtor will not receive a discharge if the presiding court 
determines that the debtor ‘has brought on or contributed to his insolvency by rash or 
hazardous speculations or by unjustifiable extravagance in living or by gambling, or by 
culpable neglect of his business affairs.’”). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2010). 
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student loans, and condominium fees.133 Second, creditors may object 
to the discharge of all debts under Section 727 based on bad behavior 
by the debtor.134 Such actions include the transfer of property with 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; destruction or 
concealment of books or records; perjury, bribery, extortion, and 
other fraudulent acts; etc.135 
The provisions in the Indian insolvency act relating to the 
discharge of debts are relatively similar to those in the U.S. 
bankruptcy code. Both have a mix of objective and subjective 
conditions for discharge that require an inquiry into the debtor’s 
frame of mind. Although this taxes judicial resources, the United 
States consumer bankruptcy system is widely used by debtors, while 
the Indian system is not widely utilized. Therefore, there must be 
other factors that account for the inaccessibility of the Indian 
consumer bankruptcy system. 
2.  In Practice 
Although practically no data exists on how the Indian insolvency 
system functions,136 some evidence suggests that few Indians take 
advantage of it.137 The disuse of the system, if true, is somewhat 
surprising because on paper, India’s insolvency system provides a 
significant measure of protection and debt relief to consumer 
debtors.138 
This scant available evidence is derived from published appellate 
court decisions, which offer an interesting window into the operation 
of India’s insolvency system.139 For example, in a case arising from 
the state of Andhra Pradesh, Mohammed Abbas Ali v. Masood Bin 
Mohammed Al-Khaili, the high court requested his clerks to report on 
 
133 Id. 
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2010). 
135 Id. 
136 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 111 (“[I]t is . . . extremely difficult to 
discern even the most general aspects of the operation of this scheme. There are no 
available data about insolvency cases in India—for example, no state-wide or country-
wide data exists concerning how many cases are filed.”). 
137 Id. at 112. However, Professor Feibelman stated in an interview that based on his 
travels to rural India, he came away with an impression that there is a functional system, 
but it functions very slowly. He said that while there are things that we tend to think of as 
defects, the system may not be dysfunctional. There are a lot of cases that get decided, and 
many disputes are resolved. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 114. 
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the number of pending insolvency petitions.140 These clerks reported a 
total of 6,113 petitions pending in Andhra Pradesh, out of a 
population of 75.7 million in 2001.141 Six thousand insolvency 
petitions is a small number per capita, especially considering that 
about a million households file for bankruptcy each year in the United 
States142 out of a population of approximately 310 million. In other 
words, there are approximately 323 bankruptcy filings a year per 
100,000 citizens in the United States, but only approximately 8 
bankruptcy filings a year per 100,000 citizens in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, a fortyfold difference. 
3.  Why Do So Few Indians Take Advantage of Bankruptcy 
Protection? 
Why do so few Indians take advantage of the bankruptcy 
provisions on the books?143 It seems that there are at least three 
categories of explanation: financial barriers to the poor, a perception 
that the system is ineffective, and cultural stigmas associated with 
bankruptcy. Analyzing what hurdles currently exist to making the 
Indian consumer bankruptcy system more accessible will help shape 
the discussion of what reforms are appropriate. 
As an initial matter, the effectiveness of the current bankruptcy 
system should not simply be measured by the number of Indians that 
file for bankruptcy. For a consumer bankruptcy regime to be 
effective, “it should be viable enough to influence consumer financial 
transactions ex ante and to affect the relationships between creditors 
and debtors ex post, especially their motivations to renegotiate.”144 It 
is often said in the U.S. that negotiations between creditor and debtor 
take place “in the shadow of bankruptcy.” Is the Indian consumer 
 
140 Id. (citing Mohammed Abbas Ali v. Masood Bin Mohammed Al-Khaili and Anr., 
2007 A.L.D. 1 (A.P.) 60). 
141 Id. 
142 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 125. 
143 In general, because there is so little data available, the author must resort to some 
degree of speculation. But cf. Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 113–14 (“In fact, there 
are reasons to believe that the role of consumer insolvency in India's society and economy 
is underestimated. Based on an informal review of the few dozen reported consumer 
insolvency-related opinions from the last decade available in Manupatra, a commercial 
legal database, it appears that a surprising number of consumer insolvency petitions are 
filed each year in India.”) (footnote omitted) (“[Certain data] suggests that a non-trivial 
number of individuals—debtors as well as creditors—view it to be in their interest to 
employ the regime. It may also reveal that the existing legal regime plays a more 
significant role in Indian society than is currently understood.”). 
144 Id. at 116. 
2011] How Consumer Bankruptcy Reforms Can Help 341 
Save Microfinance in India 
bankruptcy regime sufficiently accessible and effective to shape the 
negotiating leverage between debtors and creditors? Even if Indians 
do not tend to take advantage of the consumer bankruptcy system in 
large numbers, it may still be useful to have it there in the 
background. Failing to take the ex ante effect of bankruptcy into 
account could understate the benefits it affords to consumers through 
enhanced leverage in negotiations with creditors, even if they do not 
end up filing for bankruptcy. That being said, it is not at all clear 
whether the current regime is effective enough to impact the 
motivations of creditors to renegotiate ex ante.145 
a.  Financial Barriers to the Poor 
There is reason to believe that consumer bankruptcy will hardly 
ever be a viable option for the poor, as this is a universal problem.146 
For example, the process of filing for bankruptcy may be 
prohibitively expensive in India when you factor in the prospect of 
hiring an attorney, the cost of traveling, etc.147 Moreover, as Professor 
Dickerson points out, in developing countries the poor tend not to 
utilize formal systems for conducting business and instead rely on 
customary norms.148 The same set of reasons that discourage the rural 
 
145 Id. 
146 For arguments about how bankruptcy fees discourage bankruptcy filing in the 
United States, see generally Rafael Efrat, The Disadvantaged in Bankruptcy, 19 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 71, 74 (2002) (suggesting that filing costs, coupled with the expense of hiring an 
attorney, may disproportionately discourage disadvantaged groups from filing 
bankruptcy); see also Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification 
for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15 (1991); 
Nathaniel C. Nichols, The Poor Need Not Apply: Moralistic Barriers to Bankruptcy’s 
Fresh Start, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 329 (1994); Otis B. Grant, Are the Indigent Too Poor for 
Bankruptcy? A Critical Legal Interpretation of the Theory of Fresh Start Within a Law 
and Economics Paradigm, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 773, 782–84 (2002). However, there are a 
lot of rules that are essentially debt relief, but do not require someone to file for 
bankruptcy; for example, generous property exemptions. 
147 In the United States, although hiring an attorney is generally a good idea, the 
bankruptcy code permits pro se filings in certain circumstances. See Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256, 109th Cong. § 418 (2005). 
148 See Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneur, supra note 27, at 208 (“At a 35,000 
foot level, Sub-Saharan countries’ basic legal regimes applicable to commercial 
transactions are of a dual nature. For the foreigners and the elites, there is a version of a 
transplanted European system; and for the poor—but also for the elites when they wish to 
avail themselves of it—there is a quasi-traditional system. Inevitably, considerable 
hybridization occurs, and the boundary between the two principal regimes is blurry.”) 
(footnote omitted); Claire Moore Dickerson, The Cameroonian Experience Under 
OHADA: Business Organizations in a Developing Economy, 112 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 191, 
201 (2007) (noting that small businesses in OHADA countries tend to make decisions  
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poor from taking advantage of formal systems would presumably 
apply to the reluctance of rural Indians to take advantage of the 
bankruptcy regime.149 
b.  Perception that the System Is Ineffective 
Another reason why so few Indians take advantage of consumer 
bankruptcy could be that the system does not work very efficiently, 
indicating to consumers that the costs outweigh the benefits.150 A 
good place to start is looking at the practical effects of discharge in 
India. In the United States, one of the biggest negative consequences 
of filing for bankruptcy is the damage caused to a debtor’s credit 
rating, which lasts for a number of years but is not permanent.151 In 
India, “[i]t is not clear if individuals who receive a discharge can 
effectively obtain credit thereafter” because there is no available 
data.152 
Moreover, the glacial pace of the Indian judicial system may 
discourage consumers from filing for bankruptcy.153 Since insolvency 
cases move very slowly through the judicial system, debtors may 
believe that it is not worth their time, money, and effort to file for 
bankruptcy to protect their assets.154 Additionally, if a case is filed, 
and the debtor dutifully waits as the case slowly unfolds, the debtor is 
still not assured of protection because the substantive provisions of 
 
based on local norms rather than OHADA legal rules); Claire Moore Dickerson, 
Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 17 (2005) (arguing for increased use of general economic cooperative 
initiatives in Africa). Additional research would be useful in determining whether rural 
Indians tend to take advantage of formal system regarding enforcing contracts. 
149 See Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneur, supra note 27, at 220 (arguing that 
formal bankruptcy laws are not likely to help nano-entrepreneurs in the short term). 
150 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 112 (“In fact, there are reasons to doubt that 
many debtors are inclined to utilize the regime or that they have reason to believe that it 
would be useful to do so. The consequences of being deemed an insolvent can be severe 
while the regime's potential benefits to debtors and creditors appear uncertain and may be 
slight in many instances.”). 
151 See generally Katherine Porter, Life After Debt: Understanding the Credit Restraint 
of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
152 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 111 (noting that although there may not be a 
formal credit rating system in rural India, there may be an informal one—for example, 
village money lenders certainly remember who failed to repay a debt). 
153 Id. at 113–14. For example, if it is generally known that court cases take years to 
work their way through the system, individuals may come to the conclusion that it is not 
worth their time to file for bankruptcy. However, as Professor Feibelman notes, “there are 
some indications that cases filed recently may be more likely to be resolved quicker than 
older cases, sometimes within a year or two.” Id. 
154 Id. at 112. 
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India’s consumer bankruptcy law often afford great discretion to 
judges, making “judicial outcomes . . . unpredictable.”155 
In what circumstances do Indians tend to brave these obstacles and 
file for bankruptcy? There is some indication that, when filed, 
voluntary petitions are often filed in India “to protect the debtor from 
incarceration or otherwise aggressive debt collection.”156 This 
indicates that among those that do file, many Indians file for 
bankruptcy only when their physical security is put at risk.157 
c.  Cultural Norms 
Another factor in the low number of Indian bankruptcy filings 
might be cultural norms, such as the stigma associated with filing for 
bankruptcy.158 In Indian culture, there is a deep shame associated with 
failing to repay one’s debts, which is compounded by the intense peer 
pressure associated with the lending practices of microfinance 
firms.159 This phenomenon is illustrated by the wave of farmer 
suicides that have swept across rural India. It is possible that the deep 
shame associated with failing to pay debts in Indian culture is similar 
to the shame associated with becoming bankrupt.160 Assuming that 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 113. 
157 See Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneur, supra note 27, at 189 (noting that one 
major function of insolvency law is to provide physical security for the businessman’s 
person and property). 
158 Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 483 (2006) [hereinafter Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma] (As Professor 
Rafael Efrat notes, “[s]tigma is the social devaluation of a person who is deviant from or 
contrary to a social unit's norm.”). 
159 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
160 In the United States, there has been considerable debate about the extent that such a 
stigma has evolved over the years. See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy 
Stigma, 7 THEOR. INQ. L. 365 (2006) (attempting to measure stigma by studying 
references to bankrupts in media portrayals, and finding insufficient evidence to conclude 
that changes in the perception of stigma is directed related to increased bankruptcy 
filings); Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 158, at 485 (discussing the decreasing social 
stigma of consumer bankruptcy and the shift away from the “traditional” view that 
disparages debtors as financially irresponsible); Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2006) 
(observing that rising levels of debt is associated with financial distress); Gordon Bermant, 
What's Stigma Got to Do with It?, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2003) (reviewing studies 
trying to connect increased individual bankruptcy filings with the decline in shame and 
stigma, and questioning the soundness of using certain proxies making this connection); 
151 CONG. REC. S2421 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“People I 
have known who have gone through bankruptcy are not proudly announcing to their  
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some degree of stigma exists in Indian culture regarding filing for 
bankruptcy, this stigma might prevent debtors from taking advantage 
of bankruptcy protection, even if it were in their economic interests to 
do so.  In other words, the shame associated with bankruptcy might be 
so great that it would negate the effectiveness of any reforms 
designed to make the consumer bankruptcy system more accessible. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that cultural attitudes about debt and 
bankruptcy are not uniform throughout India, a nation of 1.18 billion 
people, four major religions, and over a dozen languages.161 Even 
assuming that many subsets of Indian society have cultural beliefs 
that stigmatize debt and/or bankruptcy, these beliefs may not be 
uniform. Meaningful bankruptcy reforms could potentially be 
effective for a large minority of the country, like those living in urban 
areas. 
B.  Specific Proposals for Strengthening Consumer Bankruptcy 
The form that proposals for strengthening consumer bankruptcy 
take is dependent on an assessment of the effectiveness of the current 
regime. Generally speaking, there may be economic, psychological, 
and cultural explanations for why Indians tend not to take advantage 
of the bankruptcy system. These barriers to greater accessibility of the 
consumer bankruptcy system could be addressed with properly 
targeted reforms. 
Professor Feibelman has offered a set of general proposals for 
strengthening the consumer bankruptcy regime in India.162 First, 
Indian policymakers could adopt procedural reforms that would make 
it easier for consumers to file for bankruptcy and therefore increase 
the negotiating leverage of debtors.163 In particular, they could 
improve the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases by 
addressing the components of the current regime that tend to make the 
process slow and relatively unpredictable. For example, a number of 
 
friends: Well, I had a great day in bankruptcy court. These are people who are a little 
embarrassed, a little ashamed of what they had to go through.”). 
161 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, India, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the            
-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
162 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 115–21 (“Assuming that India’s consumer 
insolvency regime is operational yet dysfunctional in many crucial respects, it is entirely 
possible that the regime could be markedly improved with carefully designed reforms. 
This Part does not argue that Indian policymakers should adopt any particular reform. 
Rather, it assumes that the role of consumer insolvency law in India can be enhanced, and 
it discusses some general approaches to reforming the regime that might help achieve this 
result.”). 
163 Id. at 118. 
2011] How Consumer Bankruptcy Reforms Can Help 345 
Save Microfinance in India 
rules could be reformed to rein in judicial discretion.164 Indeed, 
Professor Claire Moore Dickerson has observed that it is especially 
dangerous to grant judges wide discretion to apply legal standards in 
certain circumstances in developing countries—for example, when 
“judges are venal or incompetent, or that they have been merely co-
opted by the government through blackmail by starvation.”165 
Therefore, improving the speed and predictability of India’s consumer 
bankruptcy regime might make it more appealing to both creditors 
and debtors.166 Second, Indian policymakers could adopt substantive 
reforms that expand the availability of debt relief by, for example, 
enlarging the number of available property exemptions.167 
C.  Benefits of Strengthening Consumer Bankruptcy 
Strengthening the consumer bankruptcy system in India is 
promising for a variety of reasons. First, it may facilitate a more 
stable consumer finance market. Second, it is a good way to address 
the costs associated with expanding consumer finance. Third, it may 
help to save the microfinance industry in India by addressing the core 
grievance of the people, the imbalance of power that exists between 
debtors and creditors, while removing the impetus for misguided 
populist laws aimed at protecting the poor. 
1.  Facilitating a More Stable Consumer Finance System 
Consumer bankruptcy law can benefit both debtors and creditors in 
a way that facilitates financial transactions.168 For a debtor, 
 
164 Id. at 116–17. Rules that enable judicial discretion could be replaced with rules that 
apply automatically, thus demanding less judicial energy. Id. at 116. For example, the rule 
that requires courts to determine whether a debtor is insolvent could be replaced with a 
presumption of insolvency. Id. at 116–17. Such reforms “would be consistent with some 
broad trends in consumer insolvency and bankruptcy regimes across the globe in recent 
decades.” Id. at 117. 
165 Claire Moore Dickerson, Sex and Capital: What They Tell Us About Ourselves, 79 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1161, 1175 (2005) (in the corporate governance context). 
166 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 116. A more ambitious approach may 
include adopting a separate tribunal for consumer bankruptcy cases. Id. For a comparison 
to the approach taken in other countries to streamline their consumer bankruptcy system, 
see Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively 
Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the 
Learning Curve?, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2006). 
167 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 116, 119–21 (“Expanding the availability of 
substantive protections and the scope of potential discharge of debts might also increase 
the beneficial impact of insolvency law on economic growth and development in India.”). 
168 Id. at 105. 
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bankruptcy regimes provide a way for insolvent debtors to seek an 
orderly restructuring of their obligations, affording the debtor a “fresh 
start” after his non-exempt assets are distributed.169 For creditors, 
bankruptcy regimes solve the collective action problem that would 
exist in the absence of a bankruptcy mechanism, which harms 
creditors for at least two reasons.170 First, it can make the collection 
from insolvent debtors unpredictable.171 Second, in certain 
circumstances, it can reduce the creditor’s overall recovery, as would 
be the case when another creditor seizes the debtor’s valuable assets 
first.172 
Moreover, having a robust system in place for discharging debts is 
superior to the kind of ad hoc rebellions against paying debts that are 
more likely to occur when there are few meaningful avenues for 
formal debt relief.173 In Andhra Pradesh, a series of scandals with the 
microfinance industry triggered a rebellion against paying debts, 
causing the repayment rate to plummet from over 95% to 15%.174 As 
a result, the microfinance industry was pushed to the brink of 
collapse, and its future prospects are uncertain.175 
It seems reasonable to speculate that the absence of any meaningful 
avenue of legal debt relief played some role in exacerbating the scope 
of this crisis.176 The existing regime, with formal debt relief out of 
reach for the ordinary Indian in Andhra Pradesh, became viewed as 
intolerable when various industry abuses came to light.177 In other 
words, the status quo lost its legitimacy.178 
 
169 Id. at 105–06. 
170 Id. at 105. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Although the boycotts that erupted in Andhra Pradesh against microfinance were not 
entirely spontaneous (at some point after the protests gained momentum politicians and 
activists seemed to have taken the reins) for the purposes of this discussion they should 
nonetheless be considered “ad hoc,” in the sense that the people’s anger coalesced rapidly 
into action, which the elites did not see coming. One could compare the uprisings in Egypt 
to oust former President Mubarak and how the Muslim brotherhood joined the movement 
as its momentum gained popular strength. 
174 See Buncombe, supra note 1; Under Water, supra note 1. 
175 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
176 Although this is a reasonable assumption, it is impossible to conclude with any 
certainty that, these ad hoc rebellions would not have occurred had the consumer 
bankruptcy regime been more widely accessible. 
177 See Polgreen & Bajaj, supra note 13. 
178 To be sure, one may question whether this is nothing more than throwing a bone to 
the public. But any law that lacks legitimacy with the people rests on shaky foundations. In  
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Arguably, the long-term interests of the microfinance industry 
would be served by allowing a more predictable method of 
discharging debts. To some extent, this ad hoc rebellion is akin to a 
massive discharge all at once. A formal structure for discharging 
debts would benefit the microfinance industry over the long-term 
because it would be more predictable, and small losses could be more 
easily absorbed than one big shock. 
2.  Addressing the Costs Associated with Expanding Consumer 
Finance 
Until recently, the elites’ perception of the costs associated with 
expanding consumer finance to poor people in developing countries 
has been largely drowned out by a pro-microfinance ideology in 
media, political, and philanthropic circles.179 Research indicates that 
microfinance does a lot of good, but that its overall benefits are more 
modest than is widely believed. It is far from a magic bullet, but it 
does work “for some people some of the time.”180 The costs 
associated with expanding consumer finance, long ignored, are now 
in the spotlight, and the close scrutiny it is receiving could instigate 
an overreaction. 
Importantly, the expansion of consumer credit could generate costs 
and negative externalities for society.181 For instance, consumers may 
borrow more than they can afford in view of their projected incomes 
for a variety of reasons. They may be overly optimistic about their 
expected incomes, they may be uninformed about business risks, or 
they may lack the discipline necessary to turn their start-up business 
into a thriving enterprise.182 The resulting over-indebtedness can sink 
 
this light, it is entirely appropriate to take steps to address popular grievances in a way that 
promotes long-term growth. 
179 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the lack of media 
coverage and public interest in the disclosure of corporate human rights abuses, see 
Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 56, at 1065. 
180 See Under Water, supra note 1; Subir Roy, Lessons for Micro-Finance from 2010, 
BUSINESS STANDARD, Jan. 5, 2011, 2011 WLNR 161959 (“[I]t should be clear to all that 
micro-finance on its own cannot remove poverty. It can at best make a dent in income 
poverty. A setback, be it a flood or drought or illness, can and does take a family back to 
destitution.”). 
181 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 79. Other types of costs 
associated with expanding consumption are an increased likelihood of harmful inflation 
and an erosion of the domestic savings rate. Id. 
182 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 79. Other factors may 
include imperfect knowledge and pure luck. Another issue may be that the community in  
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consumers further into poverty.183 In addition, the recent wave of 
suicides in India illustrates that there is a psychological dimension to 
financial distress.184 Although some of those struggling with 
indebtedness have committed suicide, many more endure under 
crushing debt, which carries its own set of societal costs. 
As the costs of expanding consumer finance have been ignored, so 
too have the inadequacies of the consumer bankruptcy system.  
Professor Feibelman has speculated that the dearth of secondary 
literature on consumer insolvency in India, either by academics or by 
the various national reports, “creates a strong impression that 
commentators, scholars, and policymakers in India do not believe that 
the regime is a significant aspect of Indian society or of its 
economy.”185 
Bankruptcy’s role in facilitating development has not only been 
ignored in India; in fact, it has received scarce attention in the global 
debates over development policy.186 This is curious, considering that 
there is a general consensus that corporate bankruptcy law serves to 
facilitate sustainable economic growth.187 Downplaying the 
importance of consumer bankruptcy in this way is misplaced because 
a consumer bankruptcy system that allows for meaningful debt relief 
“can be an effective tool for reducing the social costs of consumer 
finance,” such as financial stress.188 
In other words, it is at least arguable that consumer bankruptcy can 
provide a safety valve for financial distress.189 First, bankruptcy 
protection encourages citizens to become entrepreneurs by cushioning 
the impact when they fail.190 Second, bankruptcy provides a way to 
 
which an entrepreneur starts a business may not be able to support it if there isn’t enough 
cash flow/liquidity. 
183 See Jessica Schicks, Microfinance Over-Indebtedness: Understanding Its Drivers 
and Challenging the Common Myths 1 (CEB Working Paper No. 10/048, 2010), available 
at http://www.rb-cms.nl/classes/FCKeditor/upload/65/File/overindebtness_cermi_2010 
.pdf. 
184 Id. at 80. 
185 See Feibelman, India, supra note 24, at 112. 
186 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 89. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 91. 
189 See Steven H. Kropp, The Safety Valve Status of Consumer Bankruptcy Law: The 
Decline of Unions as a Partial Explanation for the Dramatic Increase in Consumer 
Bankruptcies, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4–5 (1999) (arguing that bankruptcy provides a 
way to address financial failures and promotes risk taking by acting as a “safety valve” 
that enhances social stability). 
190 Id. 
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handle financial distress in an organized way, adding an element of 
stability to the country’s economic structure.191 
Insofar as Indian legislators are concerned with the psychological 
distress associated with over-indebtedness, “[a]llowing debtors to 
discharge at least some obligations effectively insures them from 
some of the effects of financial distress.”192 What’s more, the 
availability of bankruptcy protection may ease some of the worries of 
those that do not actually file for bankruptcy. Such individuals know 
that bankruptcy protection is an option, and as a result, they may 
suffer less of an emotional toll from their financial troubles. 
If expanding access to the consumer bankruptcy system were 
proven to promote economic growth, one might expect that a global 
consensus would emerge around this policy.193 Specifically, it would 
be reasonable to expect developing economies to incorporate a robust 
consumer bankruptcy regime into their overall development 
strategy.194 However, recent trends tell a different story.195 
It seems that Indian policymakers have been hesitant to modernize 
their consumer bankruptcy regime, even though providing meaningful 
debt relief could carry many potential benefits.196 India is not alone in 
its reluctance to increase the accessibility of consumer bankruptcy, for 
some of the largest and most rapidly developing countries have 
outdated consumer bankruptcy regimes.197 What does this suggest 
about how policymakers in these countries view consumer 
bankruptcy? 
 
191 Id. at 5. 
192 See Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 92. 
193 Id. at 95–96. Also, one might expect the neo-liberal organizations, such as the 
World Bank, to be promoting this policy, but it does not appear that the international 
financial institutions are pushing developing countries to enhance their consumer 
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One probable explanation is that policymakers are concerned that a 
“bankruptcy regime with meaningful debt relief would harm nascent 
credit markets more than help them.”198 Indeed, expanding access to 
consumer bankruptcy may have some negative consequences. First, it 
could encourage poor consumers to borrow even more due to the 
insurance function of debt relief, which diminishes some of the risks 
of borrowing.199 Second, if creditors believe that borrowers will 
become more unwilling to repay debts subject to discharge, they may 
refuse to lend to such borrowers.200 As a result, available credit could 
be reduced overall or at least to some borrowers. Third, it will 
presumably lead to somewhat higher interest rates.201 Fourth, leading 
policymakers may be subject to the influence of the elites, including 
the lender interests. It is unlikely that consumer advocates have 
enough power to counterbalance these powerful interest groups.202 
Even if an organized constituency existed to promote consumer 
interests, there may simply be a lack of social demand for these 
reforms.203 
Finally, there may be a lack of resources to expand access to 
consumer bankruptcy. In particular, the judicial or administrative 
infrastructure necessary to carry out these reforms may not currently 
exist, and their creation may cost a significant amount of money.204 
For example, it may take sustantial resources to expand the 
judiciary’s capacity to take more consumer bankruptcy cases. To the 
extent these costs are borne at the state level, it may be even more 
difficult to find these scarce resources. 
3.  Helping to Save the Microfinance Industry in India 
Strengthening the consumer bankruptcy laws may help to save the 
microfinance industry in India by addressing the very problems that 
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led to the debt rebellion. First, it may serve to correct the imbalance 
of power that exists between debtors and creditors. Second, it would 
presumably remove the impetus for misguided populist laws aimed at 
protecting the poor. 
a.  Correct an Imbalance of Power Between Debtors and Creditors 
The outrage directed towards the microfinance industry took many 
forms, including charges that it was profiting on the backs of the poor, 
engaging in abusive practices, etc.205 The core of these grievances 
against the microfinance industry dealt with the imbalance of power 
that exists between debtors and creditors. Interestingly, one 
commentator, while criticizing the Andhra Pradesh law, suggested 
that a better solution would be to enhance the “collective safety net 
for the poor.”206 Indeed, one way to bolster the social safety net in 
India would be to strengthen the consumer bankruptcy law. 
Reforming the consumer bankruptcy regime could serve to address 
the core grievances against the microfinance industry by correcting 
the imbalance of power that exists between debtor and creditor. In 
comparison to countries with robust consumer bankruptcy systems, 
Indian debtors appear to have less leverage in their dealings with 
creditors. For example, insofar as there is a widespread view that the 
bankruptcy system is not a serious option, the threat of filing for 
bankruptcy probably cannot compel the creditor to renegotiate the 
debt burden. Therefore, such reforms, like streamlining the consumer 
bankruptcy process, would have to be strong enough to lend 
credibility to a debtor’s threat of filing for bankruptcy.207 Otherwise, 
debtors in India will always lack the leverage to force negotiations 
with their creditors, and future tragedy will be assured. 
Reform of India’s consumer bankruptcy system could help shift 
public attitudes towards viewing it as part of the social safety net, 
while reducing the stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy. For 
example, there is some indication that Indian debtors view consumer 
bankruptcy as “a form of punishment or purely a debt-collection 
tool.”208 However, there is an alternative way to view consumer 
bankruptcy protection. It can also be viewed as a populist tool, and 
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instituting reforms could help debtors see that consumer bankruptcy is 
in their interests.209 In contrast, it seems that in the United States 
consumer bankruptcy is viewed as an integral part of the social safety 
net.210 In India, as consumer finance has expanded rapidly, its costs 
have been often ignored, and many unfortunate people have fallen 
through the gap in India’s social safety net, notably its lack of a robust 
consumer bankruptcy system.211 
It seems that societal disappointment over these costs has come to a 
boil after so many years, and finally the top has blown off the 
microfinance industry. Ideally, consumer finance and consumer 
bankruptcy should work in harmony to ensure sustainable growth, but 
achieving this equilibrium requires tempering the costs associated 
with expanding consumer finance. Moreover, strengthening the 
consumer bankruptcy system could also address another apparent 
inequity in the system, the asymmetry between consumers and 
businesses. Specifically, it appears unjust to have a system where 
bankruptcy is available to businesses, including banks, but not to poor 
consumer borrowers. 
b.  Remove Impetus for Bad Populist Laws Aimed at Protecting the 
Poor 
Strengthening the consumer bankruptcy system may also remove 
the impetus for misguided laws, such as capping interest rates, which 
would only serve to harm the very debtors they are meant to 
protect.212 For example, if microlending is restricted, consumers may 
be forced to rely more on village loan sharks who abuse their position 
of power.213 These laws would also harm the future of the 
microfinance industry in India by, among other things, slicing profit 
margins and reducing competition.214 Insofar as the core grievances of 
the debt rebellions have stemmed from an imbalance of power 
between debtors and creditors, this concern could be addressed 
through reforming the consumer bankruptcy regime.215 In other 
words, if policymakers address some of the underlying inequities in 
the system, specifically the imbalance of power between creditor and 
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debtor, the need to promulgate laws restricting the business practices 
of microfinance firms will be greatly reduced.216 
Finally, it is possible that increasing the accessibility of consumer 
bankruptcy could, over time, influence cultural attitudes towards debt 
in a way that would make these tragic farmer suicides less likely.217 
Microfinance companies have become successful by exploiting the 
shame that rural Indians feel towards debt. Although this makes for a 
very efficient business model, it also comes with significant social 
costs.218 It is possible that if the consumer bankruptcy system were 
reformed in a way to make it more accessible, the stigma associated 
with filing for bankruptcy could be reduced over time. For example, 
policymakers could invest in financial education that paints debt relief 
in a positive light.219 
To be sure, it is unlikely that policymakers could significantly alter 
deeply rooted cultural norms disfavoring debt and meaningful relief, 
but perhaps they could reduce enough resistance to make enhanced 
consumer bankruptcy protections worthwhile.220 Moreover, the recent 
debt rebellions provide some evidence that there is social demand for 
debt relief in India as the rise of over-indebtedness makes citizens and 
policymakers more open to expanding consumer bankruptcy 
protections.221 Before the populist revolts, there was a seemingly 
entrenched cultural belief regarding the shamefulness of failing to 
repay debts.222 It seems that these revolts changed attitudes overnight, 
for repayments levels plummeted from over 95% to 15%.223 At a 
minimum, the people no longer felt ashamed to repay these particular 
debts, perhaps due to community pressure being reversed. Before the 
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revolts, community pressure was strongly in favor of paying one’s 
debts to the microfinance companies, after the revolts the pressure 
was strongly against paying these debts. It seems that community 
anger rooted in a sense of injustice was sufficient to change the 
context around cultural attitudes. 
Perhaps consumer bankruptcy reforms could have a similar 
feedback effect to cultural attitudes towards failing to repay debts in 
general by reducing the deep shame that such a failure generates. In 
other words, codifying into law the notion that it is normatively 
acceptable to discharge your debts could have the effect of reducing 
the shame regarding debts that is widespread in Indian culture. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time to seriously consider expanding consumer bankruptcy 
protections in India. The recent rebellion against microfinance in 
Andhra Pradesh is troubling because microfinance, though imperfect, 
is an essential means of lifting the rural poor out of poverty. The root 
of the people’s grievances against the microfinance industry is 
broader than particular examples of abusive lending practices; at its 
core is a sense of injustice over an imbalance of power that exists 
between debtors and creditors. Strengthening the consumer 
bankruptcy system in India is an excellent way to address these 
grievances, while at the same time fostering the stable development of 
the consumer finance system. 
The success of consumer bankruptcy reform could depend on 
whether it rides the sort of populist wave illustrated by the debt 
rebellions. If consumer bankruptcy reforms could be framed in a way 
that captures populist, anti-bank sentiment, then it could perhaps 
change the commonly held beliefs that stigmatize debt relief in 
bankruptcy. For example, to the extent a farmer is unable to pay his 
debts and believes “there’s no way out for me,” this belief could be 
modulated through a more liberalized consumer bankruptcy regime, 
showing the farmer “a way out.” More importantly perhaps, the elites 
must be persuaded that it is in the country’s best interests to 
strengthen the consumer bankruptcy system. This article has aimed to 
convince academics and policymakers to take up the cause of Indian 
consumer bankruptcy reform. 
 
 
